Abstract-In this paper, fundamental characteristics of a general monopolistic service system with a simple structure am first investigated, and a theoretical framework for allocations of common costs is then developed. The concepts of ''fairness'' and "rationality" am characterized mathematically for the general cost allocation problem. Under the proposed framework, several available allocation methods of transmission losses could be well unified.
well-known nonlinear characteristic of the power flow equations makes the problem of rigorously and accurately allocating the losses, from the viewpoint of mathematics, an impossible task.
Several approximate methods or criteria have recently been proposed. Among them, reference [l] , (21 proposed the method based on the square of current, while in [31-[5] the equal proportional share of current was assumed. Another method is to allocate the cross-losses in proportion to current [21, [6] , [7] . Since different simplification assumptions are made in these methods, it is difficult to evaluate which one is better than others. Since it is not possible to find a mathematically solid approach for allocating transmission losses, some generally accepted principles must he followed, such as fairness and rationality. However, it is quite difficult, if not impossible, to rigorously define the so-called fairness and rationality, some generally accepted axioms from sociology and economics disciplines have to he employed for this purpose.
Given this background, it is the objective of this paper to investigate fundamental characteristics of a general monopolistic service system with a simple structure and then based on these to develop a theoretical framework for allocations of common costs. Under this framework, several existing methods for transmission loss allocations could he well unified.
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION
In this section, a simple model of the monopoly system will he used for illustrating the general characteristics of the cost allocation problem.
Let S he a public server in a general sense, and X, (k=1,2, ..., n) is a user of the monopoly system. The total number of users, i.e., n ( 1 S n 9 N ), is variable, and this means that all users could enter or quit the system freely.
Assume that x, t 0 ( k = 1,2, ..., n ) is the service quantity from server S to user X,, and the service capability (such as transmission capacity) is not taken into account. Further, assume that the common cost (such as transmission losses) function K" ( x ) , x = [xI,x2,, ..,x,T E R" is piecewise continuous.
Without loss of generality, suppose that the unit price of 0-7803-7989-6/03/$17.00 02003 IEEE cost (losses) is 1, then numerically vn (x)equals the cost. For simplicity, we define the above system model as ( S , X , K , , ] .
Let ( S , X , K J = U ( S , X , K , , User independence: all users are function independent, and this means that there does not exist any nonzero function U :R" -+ R to make U ( X ) = 0.
1)

2)
Definition 2: The cost function K" ( x ) is called regular if 1) Positive definite: the cost function is non-negative:
2) Symmetry: K " ( x ) is no different to all users X, ( k = 1.2 ,..., n , 1 I n I N ), i.e. the function value remains unchanged if any two elements of vector x are exchanged.
Generally speaking, I ) is mandatory for the cost function, Definition 3: ( S , X , r ) is said to be a simple service system
and 2) is used to simplify the structure of the cost function.
if it is no different and the cost function rn ( x ) is regular.
This means that in a simple service system the users are equal with simple cost structures. From now on, all problems to be discussed are based on the simple service system. Suppose
k=,
where, e, = [O ,..., 0,1,0 ,..., 0lT E R" is a n-dimension vector with the k-th element as I and all the other elements as zero. 
B. Principles of Cost Allocarions and Analysis of the Cost Structure
The two problems, i.e. cost allocation and cost structure analysis, are of course different but tightly related. An axiom system is built for the cost allocation in the previously defined simple service system from the viewpoint of sociology and economics disciplines.
1 ) An Axiom System: Let Q,,,(x) be the cost share allocated to user X, , k = 1,2 ,..., n , 15 n I N , in the simple service system { S , X , x n J .
A set of fairness and rationality axioms for the cost allocation is presented helow [ 8 ] .
Fairness Axiom 1 (Validity): AN allocated cost shares are non-negative, and the sum of them is equal to the total cost. 
Qx..(x)
= Qk,"+, (xs 3 xz ,. . ., xm+i) + Q n + i , n + i (~i 2 xz 9 . . . ,x,+i 1
Remark I : The four faimess axioms ensure that all users be treated equally in cost allocations, while the rationality axioms assure that coalition among users could not lead to more profits for the users concerned.
2) Economics Principle:
We could not obtain a definite allocation method directly from the axioms stated before since the applicable allocation functions are not unique. On the other hand, since there exists a tight relationship between the cost structure and the cost allocation, we have to resort to economics principle for tackling the problem. An allocation mechanism which meets the fairness and rationality axioms is presented here based on the well-known marginal costs.
The marginal cost of user X, ( k = 1,2,.. .,n , IS n 5 N ) is,
A small increment of r;, ( x ) could be expressed as
3) Methodology: Before applying the above procedure to cost allocations, we have to first determine how to deal with the cost structure and the production process of costs concerned. Based on the work of previous sections, a method based on marginal losses is presented here for allocation of transmission network losses. Suppose that the cost function of each user is monotonically increasing, i.e., for any k = 1,2 ,..., n , 1 < n 4 N , the function Eq. (11) indicates that the ratio is allocated based on the service quantity if the marginal costs are taken as the penalty factor.
There are two important and useful lemmas as stated below.
Lemma I: Suppose [ S , X , r J is a simple service system, then I ) There exists a function p(X), X is a scalar, for any I < k < n , 15 n 4 N , we have %"(?ek) =a(?) (12) here, e, =[0 ,..., OJ,O ,..., OIr E R" is a n-dimension vector with the k-th element as 1 and the others as zero. The inseparable core, i.e., core[xn(x)l, is symmetric, this means that the function value will remain unchanged if any two elements in vector x are exchanged.
2)
Proof: According to the symmetry of the cost structure, for any 15 k , l 5 n , k tl, we have q(Ye,) = q(Xe,), therefore ( I 2) holds. Then It should he mentioned that the equivalent property in lemma 2 and the symmetry in definition 2 are completely different.
A. Static Method
From (1 I), we have, 
p ( x X ) is already defined in (12).
service system, then Theorem I: Suppose [ S , X , K ] is a gaining type simple
1) The static global allocation method as shown in (14) satisfies all the fairness axioms.
2 ) The static local allocation method as shown in (15) satisfies not only all the fairness axioms, hut also the separability property rationality axiom. The proof procedure is omitted here due to the space limitation.
B. Dynamic Method
To obtain the allocation result in view of the dynamic property, we can calculate an incremental quantity first, and then sum them up. From (7) . the increment function in time f is,
which marginal function is the same as that in (6). allocation method as follow, From (13) to (15), we can obtain the dynamic global is a gaining type simple service system, and the marginal cost functions of all users are monotonically increasing, i.e. &(x) = axn(x)/dx, is the non-negative monotonically increasing function of x, for any k = 1 2 ,..., n , 15 n 5 N .
Then
1)
The dynamic global allocation method as defined in (16) satisfies all the fairness axioms.
2 ) The dynamic local allocation method 3s defined in (17) satisfies not only all the fairness axioms, hut also the separability property rationality axiom. The proof procedure is omitted here due to the space In this case the allocated shares are proportional to the currents in the inseparable core, and the separable parts could he allocated to users directly. The same conclusion could he obtained in [6] and [7] . This allocation method satisfies all fairness and rationality axioms.
C. Allocation of Losses Based on the Square of Current
If d ( x ) -" , A, = a(Cx,')/ax, = ZCx, , we can conclude q x ) x, that the allocation method is based on the square of current using either the global method or the local method. Hence, based on the theoretical framework developed, we can get the same conclusion as that in [ I ] and 121.
From the above results, it could be concluded that the developed theoretical framework could well unify several available transmission loss allocation methods.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this work, a theoretical framework for cost allocation in a general monopoly system is developed from the viewpoints of sociology and economics. Sevcral fairness and rationality axioms are presented. Based on the framework, several different allocation principles are proposed and discussed. Finally, the problem of allocating active power losses in transmission systems is investigated, and it is concluded that several existing transmission loss allocation methods could be well unified in the proposed theoretical framework. 
